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Views on Deficits and Interest Rates
Oneofthe most confusing issues in the present
debateovereconomicpolicyis the argumentover
theeffectoffederal governmentdeficits, both cur-
rent and projected, on interest rates. Widespread
confusion is understandable, in viewofthe con-
flicting views on the subjectexpressed by profes-
sional economists. Indeed, duringthe same set of
hearings before theJoint Economic Committee of
the U.S. Congress in thefall of1983,arepresenta-
tive ofthe u.s. Treasury concluded thatthe rela-
tionship between the federal deficitand interest
rates remained an open case; a representative of
the National Association ofRealtors argued that
the current deficitwas raising interest rates; and
the then-chairman ofthe Council ofEconomic
Advisers argued that justthe prospectoflarge
deficits through the rest ofthe decade was suffi-
cientto raise real long-term interest rates and thus
crowd outcurrent activity in interest-sensitive
sectors ofthe economy.
Frameworks for understanding
The purposeofthis Letter is tooutlinefourdifferent
frameworks that can be applied to the analysis of
the relationship between deficits and interest
rates. It is importantto understand that each of
these frameworks predicts a differenteffect on
interest rates for deficits. The controversy is nota
newone in economics. The same issues have
been disputed in one contextoranotherforfifty
years. Unfortunately, research efforts to date have
notbeen able todiscriminate unambiguously
amongthe various frameworks.
It is also importantto understand thatthe contro-
versy overthe impactofdeficits on interest rates
usuallyfocuses on avery limited issue. Frequently,
the exactquestion addressed is whetherfinancing
a given amountofgovernmentexpenditures by
borrowing has a differenteffecton economic
activity and interest rates than financing by taxa-
tion. Questions ofthe impactofchanges in the
size ofthe governmentsectororwhetherthe new
debt issued is purchased bythe public or mone-
tized bythe Federal Reserve have notbeen major
concernsofthe recent controversy.
Loanable funds theories
Loanablefunds theoriesofinterest rate determina-
tion view real, or inflation-adjusted, interest rates
as the "price" that adjusts to equate the supplyof
and demand for loanablefunds. Thus, proponents
ofthis theoretical approach focus on the size of
current governmentdeficits-which are one of
the sources ofdemand forfunds-in relation to
total private savings generated in the economy.
They believe an increase in the current govern-
mentdeficit relative to the flow of new private
savings causes real interest rates to rise to restore
equilibrium between the demand for and supply
ofloanablefunds. Generally, these analysts also
view the supply ofprivate savings as quite unre-
sponsivetochanges in real interestrates, at leastin
the short-run. They conclude thatthe rise in real
interestrates mustreducethedemandfor loanable
funds from other sources, notablyforfinancing
business plantand equipment and housing, by
approximatelythe same amountas theincrease in
demand presented by governmentborrowing.
Careful adherents to this approach acknowledge
thatthe reduction inthequantityofloanablefunds
demanded also could come atthe expense of
investmentabroad byaffectingthenetcapital flow
from the U.S. to foreign countries.
Portfolio balance theories
Portfolio balance theories of interest rate deter-
mination emphasize that, at every point in time,
theoutstandingstocksofall assets in an economy,
real and financial, mustbe held inthe portfoliosof
some private wealthholders (households and/or
firms). In this framework, changes in interest rates
affect the decisions ofwealthholders to hold the
outstanding stocks ofall available assets, includ-
ing government debt.
This framework explicitly recognizes that a tem-
porary increase in the deficithas a differenteffect
from an increase that persists for several years.
Compared to the enormous size ofoutstanding
stocks ofgovernment bonds and otherassets, the
flowof newgovernmentdebtcomingon to the
marketin asingleyear is small. Thus, itshould not
take muchofachange in interestrates topersuade
wealthholders to absorb a relatively small addi-
tion to their holdings ofgovernment bonds.
In contrast, deficits that are sustained over a long
period oftime accumulate into a large percentageFRBSF
change in the stock ofgovernment debt. This ulti-
mately will require a relatively large increase in
real interest rates to induce wealthholders to
absorbthecumulativedeficits intotheirportfoIios.
Thus, while loanable funds theorists predictthat
substantial changes in real interestrates will result
from deficits that are large in comparison with
currentsavings flows in an economy, portfolio
balance theorists predict such effects only after
government deficits cause significant changes in
the size ofthe outstanding governmentdebt rela-
tive to the total wealth ofthe economy.
Forward looking expectations
A variant ofthe portfolio balance theory advo-
cated by some analysts in the current discussion
overthe impactofgovernmentdeficits on interest
rates argues thatexpectations ofon-going deficits
in the future will affect long-term interest rates in
the present. This argument relies in parton the
proposition that market participants understand
that a continuing large deficit means that interest
rates in the future will have to rise significantly to
persuade investors to purchase the growing stock
of government bonds outstanding.
The other part ofthe argument involves the term
structuretheoryofinterestrates, whichargues that
current long-term interest rates are a weighted
average oftoday's short-term interest rates and
expectations aboutfuture short-term yields. Thus,
the prospect of large deficits over a long period
into the future, which means higher short-term
yields inthefutureeven though currentshort-term
rates are largely unchanged, is translated by the
market into a higher current long-term yield.
Neo-Richardian theories
The starting point for the neo-Richardian view of
the impactofdeficitfinance is theobservation that
the current sale ofgovernment debt requires
additional taxation in the future to pay the interest
costs and/or the principal when the newly issued
debt matures. In this view, a decision by the
government to finance current government
expendituresbyborrowingratherthan bytaxing is
in realityadecision to increasetaxes inthefuture,
or, to postpone them for the present. The value
discounted to the present ofthe future taxes
needed to service and repay the new debt
Iiabilitiesequalsthemarketvalueofthenewdebt.
This is true even ifthe government never plans to
repay its debtbutplans insteadto roll thedebtover
in perpetuity.
The argument that investors consider future tax
liabilities in valuing assets is widely accepted in
individual cases of certain types of securities. For
example, it is generally accepted that municipal
bonds, which are exempt from federal income
taxation, sell at lowermarketyields than Treasury
securities ofsimilar maturity because ofthe differ-
ence inthefuturetaxes thatwill haveto be paid on
the two types of securities.
Neo-Richardians generalize this principle from
individual examples to applyto the economy as a
whole. In particular, they use it to answer the
question ofwhether wealthholders regard their
holdingsofgovernmentsecurities as contributing
anything, on balance, totheirwealth, ornetworth
position. The neo-Richardian view is that inves-
tors assume that the value ofthe government
securities in their portfolios is offset by an implicit
tax liability equal to the discounted value ofthe
future taxes the government will have to levy to
service and repay the securities.
The basic neo-Richardian position is thattheoffset
is complete, meaning that on balance the private
sector regards its holdings of government debt as
contributing nothing to the sector's wealtb posi-
tion. A less extreme variant is that the offset is
incomplete because the value of government
securities derives from their unique feature as a
default-free instrumentas well as from the income
they yield. According to this variant, the excess of
themarketvalueofgovernmentsecuritiesoverthe
discounted value ofthe corresponding tax liabili-
ties reflects the premiumthe marketplaces on this
feature.
Iftaxpayers behave according to the basic neo-
Richardian view, they regard their aggregate net
wealth position as unchanged when the govern-
ment borrows to finance a deficit. If, in addition,
the fundamental determinant of their consump-tion plans is their net wealth position, a switch
from financing government expenditures by
taxation to financing by borrowing brings forth an
increase in private savings equal to the market
value ofthe new government debt. This occurs
because the reduction in taxes increases current
disposable income bythe same amount, yetthere
is nochange in privateconsumption expenditures
because privatewealth has notchanged. Thus, the
increase in disposable income is entirely saved.
The increase in the demand for loanable funds
from the extra government borrowing is therefore
exactly matched byadditional savings, leavingthe
rate of interest unchanged.
Conclusion
Much of the confusion about the impact of
government deficits on interest rates and eco-
nomicactivity in general is the resultofafailureto
identify properly the theories applied in different
analyses. At least four distincttheories have been
used to analyze the effect ofthe current and
prospective federal fiscal situation. They produce
predictions ranging from noeffect on real interest
rates from debt-financed government expendi-
tures (versus tax-financing) tosignificanteffectson
current real interest rates from any deficit that is
large relative to current private savings.
At this time, economic research is still trying to
discriminate among the competing frameworks,
but because the elements ofthe various theories
are not mutually exclusive, the task is a difficult
one. Until abetterunderstanding is reached onthe
importance of these elements in actual market
behavior, predictionsofthe impactofgovernment
deficits on real interest rates will remain impre(fise.
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT
(Dollaramounts in millions)











Loans, Leases and Investments' 2 190,223 1,039 12,398 6.9
Loans and Leases1 6 172,242 609 14,115 8.9
Commercial and Industrial 52,873 - 4 5,020 10.4
Real estate 62,588 70 2,688 4.4
Loans to Individuals 33,281 148 5,986 21.9
Leases 5,325 3 314 6.2
U.S. Treasury and Agency Securities2 11,109 461 - 1,129 - 9.2
OtherSecurities2 6,872 - 31 - 589 - 7.8
Total Deposits 197,937 4,524 8,126 4.2
Demand Deposits 47,454 3,253 970 2.0
Demand Deposits Adjusted3 30,898 1,450 923 3.0
OtherTransaction Balances4 14,116 1,025 1,083 8.3
Total Non-Transaction Balances6 136,367 246 6,072 4.6
MoneyMarket Deposit
Accounts-Total 44,027 138 3,299 8.1
Time Deposits in Amounts of
$100,000 ormore 38,940 - 124 1,005 2.6
Other Liabilities for Borrowed MoneyS 20,110 806 2,681 15.3
Two Week Averages
of Daily Figures














1 Includes loss reserves, unearned income, excludes interbank loans
2 Excludes trading account securities
3 Excludes U.S. government and depository institution deposits and cash items
4 ATS, NOW, Super NOWand savings accounts with telephone transfers
S Includes borrowingvia FRB, TI&L notes, Fed Funds, RPs and other sources
6 Includes items notshown separately
? Annualized percentchange